







CHARACTERISTICS & RESPONSES: 




 James A. Davis 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Global 








         
                         Approved by: 
                        Robert M. Jenkins 
                       Erica J. Johnson 






























James Alan Davis 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position 











James Alan Davis: Characteristics & Responses, NATO’s Initial Outputs to Russian Aggression 
in Georgia 2008, and Ukraine 2014 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 
 
This paper analyzes how NATO adapted to events of Russian aggression in Georgia 2008 
and Ukraine 2014, to help understand why there was a variance in policy outputs to the crises. 
The thesis explores how the organization mobilizes different characteristics to meet fluid security 
environments and how those traits can change over time to meet the need of NATO’s member 
states. To do so, the thesis identifies and links the main traits of NATO to key attributes 
associated with policy outputs utilizing theoretical perspectives. The thesis argues that the 
evidence is consistent in showing a preference by NATO and its influential member states of 
Germany and the United States, to respond as an institution to crises in Georgia and Ukraine. 
Moreover, events in Ukraine prompted stronger policy responses due to a crisis that impacted all 
of NATO’s key characteristics to include that of an alliance focused on collective defense and 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………………...v 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………….………………...…vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………...…....vii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………1 
CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS…………………….………………………..7 
CHAPTER 3: RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN GEORGIA – A CASE………..…………………27 
STUDY OF POLICY RESPONSES FROM KEY NATO MEMBERS 
 
CHAPTER 4: RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE – A CASE………..…………………45 
STUDY OF POLICY RESPONSES FROM KEY NATO MEMBERS 
 
















LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table 1. Examples of NATO Policy……………………………………………………….…..….8 
Table 2. Policy Examples of Key Attribute of NATO as an Alliance:  
Maximizing Power Capabilities……………………………………………………………..…...22 
Table 3. Policy Examples Key Attribute #1 of NATO as an Organization: 
 Interdependent Rules Based Cooperation………………………………………………...……..23 
 
Table 4. Policy Examples Key Attribute #2 of NATO as an Organization:  
Centralization and Independence………………………………………………………….…..…24 
 
Table 5. Policy Examples Key Attribute #1 of NATO as a Community:  
Shared Identity………………………………………………………………………………..….25 
Table 6. Policy Examples Key Attribute #2 of NATO as a Community:  
Shared Norms…………………………………………………………………………………....26 
Table 7. US Dollar Value Reports for Georgia…………………………………………….……38 
Table 8. Policy Example Timelines for Georgia………………………………………………...40 
Table 9. Policy Outputs in the Case of Georgia……………………………………………….…44 
Table 10. Policy Outputs for the Case of Ukraine……………………………………………….65 













LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Theory to Outputs……………………………………………………………………11 
Figure 2. Key Attribute Relationship…………………………………………………………..12 

























LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AA – Association Agreement 
ABCT – Armored Brigade Combat Team 
ANP – Annual National Program 
AWACS - Airborne Early Warning and Control  
C4 – Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Networks 
DEEP – Defense Education Enhancement Program 
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction & Development  
ERI – European Reassurance Initiative 
EU – European Union 
FMF – Foreign Military Financing 
FMS – Foreign Military Sales 
FP – Force Posture 
FY – Fiscal Year 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GTEP – Georgia Train & Equip Program 
HQ - Headquarters 
II – International Institution 
IMET – International Military Education & Training 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IO – International Organization  
MS – Member States 
NAC – North Atlantic Council 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NFIU – NATO Force Integration Unit 
NGC – NATO Georgia Commission 
NRC – NATO Russia Council 
NRF – NATO Response Force 
NUC – NATO Ukraine Commission 
viii 
 
MAP – Membership Action Plan 
OSCE – Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe 
RAP – Readiness Action Plan 
SECGEN – Secretary General 
US – United States 
VJTF – Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 







CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008, and the illegal annexation of Crimea, Ukraine in 
2014, have renewed security concerns for the transatlantic security alliance. For an alliance that 
had recently been faced with crisis management and humanitarian aid tasks, a renewed threat has 
led to new policy outputs to meet these challenges. In each crisis, NATO and its influential 
member states provided policy responses to the conflict in the form of statements, changes in 
force posture, and economic factors. 1 However, the organization and its member states provided 
a stronger policy response to the crisis in Ukraine relating to collective defense.  
The variants in outputs have led scholars like John Deni to argue that NATO has returned 
to a role that is “first and foremost” concerned with conducting collective defense as an alliance 
versus its role as an organization or that of a community. 2 However, there is a debate within the 
international relations community of scholars over the role of international security organizations 
in responding to security crises. Marc Webber helps to explain that these roles are characteristics 
of NATO:3 an alliance focused on collective security, an international organization that provides 
a neutral and interdependent forum for enforcing “rules”, and a community based on shared 
                                                          
1 Summits provide venue for supporting economic factors like sanctions for MS. Changes in FP also require funding 
for programs like defense reform educational assistance.  
2 (Deni, NATO and Article Five, 2017).  
3 Characteristics and traits of NATO will be related to different “roles” or “identities” the organization takes in 
response to changing security environments. For this reason, the thesis will use these words interchangeably.  
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identities and norms from common values.4 In search for an answer to the variance in policy 
outputs, these characteristics will help interpret the policy outputs of NATO and its influential 
MS by explaining the “role” that was taken by NATO in response to these specific security 
crises. 
Threat perceptions and state interests are two factors that member states of NATO 
prioritize and balance that impact objectives and policy outputs. In an alliance that had prior to 
the crisis in Georgia expanded multiple times, these threat perceptions and interests can 
sometimes differ amongst the MS of NATO. Theoretical explanations for how the alliance 
maneuvers past these differences differ by the scholar asked and time period analyzed. 5 In the 
Cold War in the face of a unified threat the alliance was focused on its tasking for collective 
defense. In the 1990s, the organization transitioned to a role as a community based around 
collective security and responded to out-of-area humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
based on shared values. 6 All the while the organization continued to grow and has developed a 
more centralized and independent administrative staff than in its founding years. 7 These phases 
of NATO development and adaptation highlight different interpretations of the role of NATO: 
that of an alliance with a strong focus on state interests; that of an international organization with 
its own autonomous power; and, that of a community based upon an expansions of values 
outside those of just survival and defense.  
                                                          
4 (Webber, 2009) 
5 (Armitage JR, 2008). The first chapter details the continuing debate amongst scholars of the lingering questions 
surrounding the impact of theory and NATO’s political decision-making framework.  




While the focus of the thesis is on interpreting policy outputs in answer to recent Russian 
aggression in Eastern Europe, the thesis attempts to analyze these responses based on what 
NATO is. The key traits of the organization are prioritized and balanced based upon the needs of 
its member states to help the organization adapt to meet new challenges. In responding to 
changes in the security environment one characteristic of the organization may be more at play 
than others, or a combination of traits may be evident. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall the 
transition has been ongoing. Humanitarian crises were met by a growing institutional staff by the 
organization. The alliance has gradually grown in common values. Prior to the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the alliance was most concerned with the shared value of survival. Actions in the Balkans 
conflicts signaled an expansion of these common values held by MS and the ability to utilize 
force to uphold them. With each new member addition, change in institutional capacity, or 
change to MS prioritization of common values, like humanitarian concerns over that of territorial 
defense, the alliance learns and grows. The recent reemergence of Russian aggression has 
renewed territorial defense concerns for the alliance. Which key trait or traits of NATO were 
evident in these moments of crises, can help indicate how NATO might respond to future crises 
or simply showcase how NATO has adapted to recent security challenges. 
As the organization has continued to expand and meet new security crises, goals and 
objectives for the alliance are still decided by consensus of all its members. Influence in the 
process used to reach a consensus within NATO is debated by scholars and policy makers alike. 8 
While some scholars like John Mearsheimer have argued that the policies enacted by 
organizations like NATO are decided as a result of influential member state strategies for 
                                                          
8 (Hendrickson, 2006). Ryan Hendrickson contributes to the research on the political decision-making process by 
examining the ever-changing role of the secretary general and the roles implication from the 1990s forward. 
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increasing power in the security environment, 9 other scholars have argued that NATO responds 
with multilateralism, ultimately deciding the policies with bargaining from all sides and 
indicative of an international organization. 10 Constructivists have linked responses to shared 
identities and norms, with stronger reactions prompted by actions that go against the 
“communities values.”11 Ultimately, NATO enacted policy outputs in response to Russian 
aggression in Georgia and Ukraine. How do the characteristics of NATO help interpret the 
policy outputs of the organization in response to Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008 and in 
Ukraine 2014?  
To help explain differences in NATO responses to recent Russian aggression in Ukraine 
and Georgia, I will use international relation theories to identify attributes of NATO that link the 
key characteristics to policies. I will investigate the results of the case studies based on the key 
attributes of NATO. I will apply the three theories to key characteristics of NATO identified by 
Mark Webber: organization, alliance, and community. I will use the relationship between the key 
features of NATO and the three theories of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and 
constructivism to identify key attributes connected to a characteristic of NATO and its 
corresponding theoretical perspective. Key attributes were chosen for each characteristic: 
maximizing power capabilities for NATO as an alliance, interdependent rules-based cooperation 
as well as centralization and independence for NATO as an organization, and shared identity and 
shared norms for NATO as a community. The initial Policy outputs by NATO and its influential 
                                                          
9 (Mearsheimer, 2001) 
10 (Armitage JR, 2008). The first chapter cites many of the leading scholars’ views based on theory for this 
argument. 
11 (Webber, 2009) 
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member states of Germany and the United States to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine 
will be analyzed. The policy outputs of Germany and the United States will be added to look for 
consistency of responses with certain characteristics of NATO, i.e. is the alliance acting in a role 
best described as a community based on shared values and identity or are member states 
responding more consistently in a role best described as a tool for maximizing power 
capabilities.12 The thesis specifically chose Germany and the United States for the influence they 
currently have in the organization and in the international community at large.13 In the 
conclusion I will combine the result of the analytical chapters to formulate my thesis. 
In analyzing the policy outputs from NATO based on its key traits, the results will be 
show NATO consistently responding to events in Georgia and Ukraine as an international 
institution. However, the evidence indicates consistency of NATO acting as a community based 
on shared norms and identity and an alliance focused on maximizing power capabilities to the 
crisis in Ukraine. The evidence explains that institutional responses like the creation of the 
NATO-Georgia Commission, did not prevent future Russian aggression in Ukraine. Instead the 
events in Ukraine represented the second recent instance of territorial intrusion into a NATO 
partner14 and placed events that took place in Georgia in a new light. The aggression in Ukraine 
was geographically closer to NATO MS in the Baltics and in Poland. Together the changing 
security environment in Ukraine confronted all three key traits of NATO. It represented a threat 
                                                          
12 Exploring just NATO policy responses would suffice for analyzing the “role” of NATO as an organization. Key MS 
responses are needed to compare NATO’s response relating to its key traits of an alliance and community.  
13 Germany’s influential role in the European Union based upon its economic might. The US influential role is based 
upon its military and economic might. 
14 While Georgia and Ukraine were not MS of NATO. They had entered into partnerships with NATO which will be 
discussed more in depth later in the case studies.  
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to NATO as an institution by showcasing that any partnership between NATO and non-member 
states would not prevent territorial aggression by the Russians. It renewed territorial defense 
concerns due to proximity to NATO MS. And, the events showcased a threat to NATO’s shared 
identity of international norms like peaceful resolution to conflict through multilateralism. This 
thesis will argue that the evidence is consistent in showing a preference by NATO and its 
influential member states of Germany and the United States, to respond as an institution to crises 
in Georgia and Ukraine: while the latter incident prompted stronger policy responses due to a 
crisis that impacted all of NATO’s key characteristics, including that of an alliance focused on 
















CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
What is the Focus of the Research? 
 The evidence to be interpreted is NATO policy outputs immediately following Russian 
aggression in Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014. Research will be focused on the years prior and 
after the specific instance of initial Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine. The central 
question is how NATO and MS responded during periods of crises. These key instances give 
critical insight into which attributes of the organization are evident in those uncertain moments 
of time.  
Policy Outputs 
 Prior to introducing or discussing the evidence it is important to discuss what the 
evidence will be. Definitions are needed for key terminology. Policy is a term that possesses 
different meanings depending on whom is asked. NATO relates policy to agreed-upon principles 
by NATO members to achieve specific outcomes. 15 The United States Department of Defense 
distinguishes policy as a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the 
national government to pursue national objectives. 16 The thesis considers that policy is strategic 
by nature and borrows from the US Air Force’s Lemay Center for Policy’s understanding: that it 
                                                          
15 (NATO Terminology, 2018) 
16 (Defense, 2018) 
8 
 
is specified guidance that must be taken. 17 Policy for the purposes of the thesis will not be 
related to official state stances or NATO stances. It will be understood as “action/s” taken, that 
is/are strategic by nature, instructive, and are emplaced to achieve specific outcomes. Simply put, 
policy responses are defined as a set of tools at the disposal of NATO or its member states to 
achieve their strategic goals. In this regard, I will use the term policy output or response 
interchangeably.   
Table 1 Examples of NATO Policy  
Force Posture Statements Economic Factors 
Troop Movements Communiques MS Sanctions 
Deployments Strategic Concepts Funding/Assistance 
Changes in NATO Structures Press Releases MS FMS/FMF 
Defense Planning Summit Statements MS Financial Aid 
Increase in Troop Strength Publications Military Procurements 
 
Examples of policy responses to be studied include statements, press releases, and 
strategic concepts. In addition to statements, policy outputs will also be defined by broad courses 
of actions, as they relate to major economic changes or changes in military force posture. While 
NATO does not introduce economic sanctions, like all international organizations it provides a 
forum for multilateralism for its MS who possess the capability to introduce such economic 
measures. Economic measures are also indicative of changes that can increase or decrease power 
capabilities of MS or the threat faced by the alliance: such as military aid or foreign military 
sales of equipment, foreign funding/assistance, troop movements, and/or defense procurement 
planning. Examples of changes in force posture are major troop movements, staging, 
deployments, exercises, or any activities that can provide impact to the military capabilities of 
                                                          
17 (Curtis Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 2015)  
9 
 
the organization, its MS, or its partners. However, force posture changes can also indicate any 
changes to the structures of NATO: i.e. membership in the alliance, new partnerships, or 
strengthening institutional ties by bolstering civilian staff or existing partnerships.18 I argue that 
increases in these areas allow for the alliance to have greater power capabilities, thus are 
included in the force posture changes. 
 Examples of policy outputs from the year prior to each incident will be examined to 
provide a baseline perspective. Policy outputs by NATO and/or its members during the time 
frames listed were not equal in their impact or scope. A statement of condemnation in the face of 
aggression is not equal to major troop movements or a consensus decision of NATO to fund 
major exercises. Troop deployments of 500 personnel are therefore not universally accepted as 
stronger or weaker than major economic sanctions for instance. Either can be preferred options 
by MS for policy outputs.  
Linking Theory to Outputs 
According to scholars David Armitage and Mark Webber, structural realism, liberal 
institutionalism, and social constructivism are the dominant perspectives advanced by academics 
on how NATO responds to crises. 19 Both scholars posit that aligning a singular theoretical 
perspective to NATO policies is less favorable than comparing to a multi-theoretical view. 20 
Armitage’s argument says a theoretical perspective might change depending on the assignment 
                                                          
18 Examples include taking an existing partner and extending a Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
19 (Armitage JR, 2008; Edited by Webber, 2016) Armitage presents theory as it relates to non-crises moments such 
political bargaining relating to the European Defense Community. Mark Webber has authored several works 
relating to the study of theory in NATO. The two scholars are not the only scholars who have completed work in 
the field but represent the most recent and relevant work to the subject matter. 
20 (Armitage JR, 2008, pp. 7-11) (Webber, 2009, pp. 7-10) 
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of NATO’s identity as either an ‘individual, group, or bureaucracy.’ 21  Webber argues that 
introducing multiple perspectives presents a broader understanding of the issue being studied and 
is ‘complementary’ rather than ‘conflicting’. 22 In 2016, Webber wrote that the introduction of 
multiple perspectives is not ‘pluralism’ in the ‘combining’ of theories, but instead the viewing of 
the issue at hand through different perspectives which enable the viewing of each issues 
strengths and weaknesses. 23  
I agree with the two scholars’ opinions on the applicability of viewing through multiple 
perspectives and the choices in theories they chose. NATO presents a unique situation for 
scholars and policy-makers. The objectives for the alliance and the policy decisions to achieve its 
goals are enacted by a consensus-based decision process in NATO’s North Atlantic Council. 24 
The assemblage of member states since its inception has not been static in terms of common 
goals, threat perceptions, or even actors making consensus for policy responses difficult. 25 The 
alliance has steadily enlarged since the fall of the Soviet Union, with three expansions prior to 
the events in Ukraine bringing in an additional twelve members. 26 Decision-making has become 
more complex due to NATO growing as an organization, the number of new members in NATO, 
and the interests of each of these new MS. It is unlikely that all members possess equal 
perceptions of policy goals, and with each addition in membership the possibility of 
                                                          
21 (Armitage JR, 2008, p. 11) 
22 (Webber, 2009, pp. 9-10) 
23 (Edited by Webber, 2016, pp. 9-12) 
24 (Clausson, 2007, p. 86) 
25 Goals can be defined as the objectives set forth in NATO’s Strategic Concepts.  
26 (Sloan, 2016) 
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disagreement grows. The accumulation of more members to NATO requires continuous 
adaptation of goals and outputs to meet the needs of its member states. To understand how the 
recent additions to NATO and the growth of the organization impact policies, it is helpful to 
apply multiple theories to help understand all vantage points in the security environment.  
To apply a theory to the policy differences directly presents a challenge. Multiple theories 
can be applied to policy outputs and be misinterpreted if proper context of the security 
environment is lacking. To simplify and best understand how the multi-theoretical approach to 
the thesis will be linked, I will demonstrate a clear connection between the theories and the focus 
of the study, NATO policy outputs. I posit that policies are enacted to fulfill an objective or a 
“goal”. Goals are implemented as a result of the interaction with the security environment NATO 
finds itself in, which in turn is based on the interests of the MS and of the organization. The 
theories help explain the relationship of how the environment (e.g. a reemergent threat from 





To help apply theories to understanding the evidence, I will utilize Mark Webber’s key 
characteristics of NATO as they relate to the main theories to be examined. I will use the key 
traits of NATO associated with the theories to build an understanding of how states and IOs 
exhibit behaviors during security crises in accordance with each perspective. For every theory I 
intend to introduce “key attributes” that can be associated with the three characteristics of 
NATO. I focus on identifying the qualities most associated with the characteristics of NATO.27 
This knowledge will help build a framework from which policy outputs by NATO and its key 
member states of Germany and the United States can be interpreted for consistency. 
 
According to Mark Webber, NATO possesses three “characteristics”: an inter-
governmental organization, an alliance with a collective tasking for security, and a community. 28 
Webber suggests that the three traits of NATO can be explained by the dominant international 
                                                          
27 Each theoretical perspective in this chapter will focus on expected policy responses according to a certain 
characteristic. From these, I select the attributes I believe are “key”. The attributes listed are the most consistent 
with the relationship between NATOs core traits and the theoretical perspectives identified. 
28 (Webber, 2009); Essay section titled “How to Study NATO.” Third Paragraph.  
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relation theories to provide insight into how common policy is made inside of NATO. 29 The 
three primary theories examined in the context of this chapter are realism, liberal 
institutionalism, and constructivism. In examining the policy outputs of NATO and its key 
influential states, consistency and patterns might indicate which attributes of NATO were being 
exhibited in policy output creation. By examining these policies outputs through a theoretical 
framework that allows for multiple perspectives, the evidence can provide scholars and policy 
makers sagacity concerning past responses, existing issues within the alliance that impact 
security crises, and future concerns. 
An Alliance with a Focus on Collective Defense 
 In this section, the role and perception of NATO as an alliance is presented in relation to 
realism theory. The term ‘alliance’ will imply the banding together of states to achieve a 
common goal or goals. The bedrock of NATO is the Article 5 clause of NATO’s founding 
charter. Article 5 states that ‘an attack on one or more of the members, is an attack against all,’ 
and solidifies that members will come to the assistance of the country or countries attacked. 30 
However NATO is more than just an alliance that offers treaty protection. The structural 
framework for collective defense in NATO offers the allied states a unified and staffed military 
command structure, planning procedures and guidance, and a place for political bargaining to 
take place in the North Atlantic Council.31 
                                                          
29 (Webber, 2009); Essay section titled “How to Study NATO.” 
30 (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949) 
31 (Sloan, 2016) 
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Theorists such as Kenneth Waltz, have utilized realism theory to explain state actors’ 
behaviors. 32 Waltz argues that the world is anarchic, meaning without a centralized power 
structure. 33 Therefore, states are primarily concerned with their ability to survive because they 
exist in a world of perpetual conflict that lacks an overarching central source of power. 34 Waltz 
maintains that while states possess some form of military capabilities to hurt one another, these 
capabilities are not equal. 35 Mark Webber explains, Waltz’s concern is the distribution of 
‘capabilities’ among the states, and the distribution determines what the states can and can’t 
do. 36 The distribution of ‘capabilities’ can impact policies, states that possess higher levels of 
capabilities set the policy tone that less powerful states may be more inclined to agree with, or 
band together to compete against. 37  
In realism theory, external threat perceptions are very important in deciding policy 
responses by states and alliances. If a common threat exists, states might band together because 
of the incentive for intra-alliance cooperation such as higher combined capabilities. According to 
John Mearsheimer, a state’s ultimate goal is survival which drives the push for greater 
capabilities than those of other states.38 Weaker states in their quest for survival would seek an 
alliance with an influential MS instead of competition for capabilities for “stability” purposes. 39 
                                                          
32 (Armitage JR, 2008). Chapter 1. Section titled “Structural Realism.” 
33 (Waltz, 1995) 
34 (Waltz, 1995) 
35 Ibid 
36 (Webber, 2009, p. 12) 
37 Ibid 




Mearsheimer presents the argument that NATO might see a demise in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. 40 Central to his argument is the assumption that a lack of a unified threat would abolish the 
necessity of a collective defense treaty-based organization. 41 Weaker states would not need to 
align themselves with a state possessing higher capabilities, and stronger states would lack 
incentive to band together with weaker states to maximize their capabilities.  
Identifying a key characteristic of realism is useful in understanding NATO’s response as 
an alliance to Russian threats. The theory is focused on the survival of its members. The main 
characteristic of the theory would imply a unified threat perception of its members would result 
in MS seeking to maximize their capabilities according to John Mearsheimer. Policy outputs 
indicative of an organization or state reacting in this manner would include defensive actions in 
terms of exercises, defense procurements, troop movements, and/or economic actions that 
increase the alliance’s ability to project capabilities or decrease the threat’s ability to maximize 
their capabilities. NATO’s responses according to the theory would then suggest the member 
states would respond militarily (even if only with exercises), seek to maximize their power 
capabilities, and/or decrease their threat’s ability to project power. 
An International Organization 
 To understand the concept of NATO possessing the characteristic of an international 
organization, I will focus on neoliberal institutionalism theory. Prior, the thesis examines the 
                                                          




definition of an international organization (IO).42 Mearsheimer posits that the definition of 
institutions is focused on ‘rules’ which then ‘stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate 
and compete with one another.’ 43 Robert Keohane argues rules are more pronounced and can be 
both ‘formal and unformal,’ and come attached with ‘prescribed roles, constrain activity, and 
shape expectations.’ 44 I agree with scholars Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, that John 
Mearsheimer’s explanation for international ‘institutions’ provides a better definition than those 
that possess rigid defined roles for state actors in an organization.45  
The perspective of neoliberal institutionalism theory can be applied to studying policy in 
NATO. The theory agrees with realism, in that states are rational actors in a world lacking a 
central power source. 46 The disagreement comes in part with how states seek to “survive” in 
such a world. Liberal institutionalists, like Robert Keohane, argue that the preferred and most 
beneficial route for states to assure survival is to be in an “institution” based on rules. 47 Through 
a shared understanding of the rules, institutions are an optimal path forward for states to 
maximize benefits through cooperation. Nation states in an institution seek a rules structure that 
in turn gives every state involved credibility, reduced transaction costs, and stability resulting in 
mutual benefit. In applying the theory specifically to Europe and security studies, scholar Stanley 
                                                          
42 (Simmons, 2013) I will use the term “international organization” and “international institution” interchangeably. 
While more nuance could be provided with additional research, it is not the focus of the thesis. NATO possesses 
attributes of both a “brick and mortar” organization with a staff, and also a forum for multilateralism with a 
structure based upon “rules”. 
43 (Simmons, 2013, p. 328) 
44 (Simmons, 2013) 
45 (Simmons, 2013) 
46 (Armitage JR, 2008, pp. 29-37) 
47 (Keohane, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 39-51) 
17 
 
Hoffman argues that by creating ‘overlapping institutions’ states which may have previously 
been ‘potential adversaries’ are joined together for mutual benefit with the institution providing 
‘reassurance and insurance’ to its members. 48 
 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal argue that institutions have been useful to states 
based on the ‘centralization’ and ‘independence’ they provide.49 They posit that ‘centralization’ 
has inherent benefits, such as ‘collective pooling of resources,’ ‘lowered ‘transaction costs’ for 
items like military equipment, and ‘norm coordination’.50 ‘Independence’ also allows states to 
contribute to policies enacted by the institution that they otherwise may not have conducted 
unilaterally. They use the term ‘laundering’ to describe such actions.51 Institutions are also a way 
of ensuring that states can “trust” that opposing states are not cheating or ensure that cheating is 
“limited”. 52 According to their argument an institution possesses ‘administrative staff’ that acts 
as a ‘neutral’ intermediary. 53  
For example, disagreements over the unified response to the conflict in Bosnia in the 
1990s were apparent between the European members of NATO and the Americans (who initially 
advocated for no troops on the ground). 54 NATO Secretary General Willy Claes oversaw a 
                                                          
48 (Armitage JR, 2008) Reassurance that there exists a neutral party to ensure states do not try to break the rules to 
gain capabilities. Insurance being that states have protection in an alliance that is structured on rules with 
penalties for those that do not comply with the common values like territorial integrity. 
49 (Abbott, Vol. 42, No. 1 (FEB., 1998)) 
50 Ibid 
51 (Abbott, Vol. 42, No. 1 (FEB., 1998)) 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
54 (Yost D. S., 2014) p. 128 
18 
 
transformation of the role of the Secretary General in providing direction and allowing consensus 
to be reached during his one year tenure on issues ranging from targeting choices for aerial 
bombardments to addressing which “red lines” had been crossed to trigger such a response. 
Claes used his position to ensure disagreements over targeting and the use of NATO air 
campaigns could be resolved between MS. 55 In doing so, he kept ambassadors longer at 
meetings than previous SECGENs, and at times used existing authorizations to implement 
decisions versus reconvening the NAC. 56 With this new expanded role, NATO administrative 
staff possessed greater ability to make policy decisions, which in the 1950s-1960s would have 
been made at the national level.  
 Two characteristics of what a neoliberal institutionalism theory-based NATO policy 
response to Russian aggression would be multilateralism and a “rules” grounded response. 
Important traits associated with the theory are a central and independent administrative staff that 
encourages the following of rules and discourages cheating. Partnerships or other existing 
interdependent institutional structures would likely be sought to be strengthened by increasing its 
taskings, increasing membership, or by the creation of new overlapping institutional structures.57 
More institutional systems, commissions, and/or structures would be sought.  Another trait 
would be that of multilateralism, a focus from the member states would be on utilizing NATO as 
an intermediary to first end the conflict versus that of any offensive action with military forces. 
Member states would show a preference for a multilateral response that would be guided through 
                                                          
55 (Hendrickson, 2006) 
56 Ibid 
57 An example of an overlapping structure: Ukraine was a NATO Partner for Peace and had the NATO-Ukraine 
Council. After the annexation of Crimea, a trust was created for the creation of various defense reform measures. 
19 
 
the administrative structure and system of NATO versus that of influential member states 
unilateral actions.  
NATO as a Community 
 Constructivism theory focuses on the social construction of ideas and institutions. 58 The 
ideas are interrelated to an identity that is created through socially constructed norms and 
values. 59 Values are the shared ideals that the community wants to uphold, such as human rights 
and liberal democratic ideals.60 Norms are how the values are achieved, like a commitment to 
multilateralism through political bargaining in the NAC.61 The norms provide the structural 
process to uphold the shared identity. 62 The community is therefore made of actors sharing a 
“culture” based on these norms and values. Mark Webber argues that constructivism relates to 
NATO through positive and negative perceptions based upon common identities and accepted 
norms. 63 NATO shapes common identity through shared values that include human rights, 
democratic principles, respect for territorial integrity and soveirgnity, and self-determination.  
 The perception of identities, norms, and values shape how influential state actors and 
NATO, as a community,64 responds to security crises. In realism, states are willing to be in an 
alliance and respond to security crises to increase their capacity or to appease an influential MS 
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63 (Webber, 2009, p. 22) 
64 According to (Schimmelfennig, 2003), community is a group that shares an identity.  
20 
 
for greater stability in order to survive. In a neoliberalism perspective, rules provide benefits to 
state actors, limit cheating, and require responses based partly on common values. In a 
constructivist’s viewpoint, rules are followed based on shared identities and norms based on 
common values. 65 While attributes of neoliberal institutionalism theory helped identify the push 
for a greater role by the NATO Secretary General, it failed to explain why NATO sent forces to 
the Balkans when the “rules” did not call for their deployment. 66 A better answer can be found in 
constructivism theory. NATO forces responded in Bosnia as a result of humanitarian concerns. 
Policy outputs can then be interpreted as being representative of the communities shared values 
and their identity at the time of implementation.  
 The characteristics of constructivism theory in relation to acts of Russian aggression 
would focus on NATO as a community. Policy outputs would be consistent with a shared 
identity, to include common values. A failure to see action could indicate either multiple threat 
perceptions or an inconsistent application of values. Constructivism in the case of NATO would 
take the shared values from strategic concepts and would be expected to apply shared values 
consistently regardless of geography. The means to achieve shared values, the alliance’s norms, 
would be focused on the norms by which NATO operates: political bargaining, consensus-based 
outputs, and strong partnerships even with non-member affiliated states.  
Applying Evidence 
 In both case studies, evidence will be gathered in each of the key policy output areas of 
force posture, economic factors, and statements. Evidence will be introduced as it relates to the 
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key attributes of the characteristics of NATO: an international institution, an alliance focused on 
collective defense, and NATO as a community. Policy outputs from the key influential states will 
provide evidence that: 
a) impacted the path NATO took in policy response  
b) preceded NATO’s response 
c) can be used to triangulate reasoning for why NATO pursued a certain path 
 
The analysis of the evidence will take part in the case studies. The evidence will be presented in 
chronological order according to type of policy output. Both case studies will review NATO 
policy responses prior to reviewing outputs for the United States and Germany. At the 
conclusion of each case study the analysis of the responses will be presented. Policy outputs will 
be analyzed for consistency with the key attributes of each NATO characteristic. 
Attribute of NATO as an “Alliance”  
The first key attribute belongs to an alliance. Building from realism theory, the traits of 
NATO as an alliance can be characterized by key actions that act as a bridge between theory and 
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output. I will introduce this key attribute and explain the differences of approach and how it can 
overlap with other theoretical perspectives key attributes.  
Key Attribute of NATO as an Alliance: Maximizing Power Capabilities  
A key attribute of the characteristic of NATO as an alliance is the member states 
unilaterally and/or collectively seeking to maximize power capabilities in times of crisis. 
Realism is useful in explaining the logic behind the accumulation of capabilities during the Cold 
War. Realism posits that states seek to maximize their power in relation to the threat 
encountered.67 The ultimate goal and value shared by MS is survival. MS interests come first in 
policy outputs.68 In linking with security crises, I posit that states acting consistently with this 
viewpoint prefer a smaller alliance unless a new partner or ally presents an increase in 
capabilities. NATO expansionism would be stopped unless it is in the interest of MS, which 
include economic interests or increased power capabilities from the prospective new member. 
Unlike constructivism, boundaries matter and norms and values matter only if they help the MS 
interests in pursing power. A unified threat was presented to members of the transatlantic 
alliance by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. NATO brought about “tools” to allow for a 
greater collection of capabilities: a unified joint nation military command structure, planning 
committees for the purposes of defense planning and procurement, and additional power 
capabilities from pooling resources collectively. In responding to a security crisis, states seek to 
increase their power capacity. Linking to Russian aggression in 2008 and 2014, the attribute 
suggests policy responses that are consistent with states building capabilities in relation to the 
                                                          




threat faced. Realism suggests that the actor in maximizing capabilities can be either NATO or 
its MS. Therefore, outputs from each can provide evidence for increasing military capabilities or 
expose responses between the alliance and MS that are inconsistent with confronting a threat: for 
example, when NATO acts to increase capabilities but a MS does not.  
Table 2 
Policy Examples of Key Attribute of NATO as an Alliance: Maximizing Power Capabilities 
Statements Force Posture Economic Factors 
Not seen with this attribute: 
declarations that support 
maximizing power, would 
belong to Force Posture or 
Economic Factors 
A change (normally an 
increase) impacting: the defense 
procurement planning process, 
rebalancing military forces and 
civilian workers, lethal aid, 
military exercises, defense 
spending, troop deployments, 
prepositioning military 
equipment, or other positive 
change to capabilities. 
Examples of economic actions 
that impact maximizing power 
capabilities include increases of 
military sales to partner or 
allied nations, funding of 
exercises or security 
cooperation events, and/or 
sanctions that limit the ability of 




Attributes of NATO as an “Organization”  
I will now introduce two key attributes associated with the theory of neoliberal 
institutionalism. The two attributes are examples from which policy outputs can be evaluated for 
consistency in connection with the key traits of NATO as an organization.  
Key Attribute #1 of NATO as an Organization: Interdependent Rules Based Cooperation69  
 As referenced in chapter two, neoliberal institutionalism argues rules encourage 
cooperation through a structured process. Capabilities then don’t prompt compliance with shared 
values like respect for territorial borders, it is the “rules” of the structural institutions. In applying 
this attribute to the characteristics of NATO as an organization, in security crises the first actions 
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would be a rules-based response through a multilateral mechanism to prompt compliance of the 
standards established by the organization. The rules either enforce or create the overlapping 
interdependent structures that incentivize cooperation through compliance with the rules set forth 
by the members.70  
Table 3 
Policy Examples Key Attribute #1 of NATO as an Organization: Interdependent Rules Based 
Cooperation 
Statements Force Posture Economic Factors 
Announcements as policy 
responses would seek to identify 
the institution as the primary 
actor instead of an influential 
MS. Outputs would be 
generated through multilateral 
efforts. Key indicators might 
include the organization or its 
administrative staff issuing 
guidance prior to responses from 
its influential members.  
 
Changes would include actions 
on the civilian and military sides 
of NATO as an organization: 
changes in programs for defense 
education, partnership programs, 
commissions, or dialogues 
between the states. Other 
changes would be the expansion 
of unified joint command 
structures. The creation of joint 
military headquarters or 
command structures, which 
would indicate “overlapping” 
institutional structures to the 
existing command structure. 
 
Economic actions as a result of 
political bargaining through 
NATO mechanisms such as 
summits: to provide policy 
outputs focused on tasks outside 
of collective defense and 
provide a more complex 
interdependency amongst MS. 
Examples might include the 
endorsement of sanctions or 
calls for collective economic 
actions through NATO 
structures. The creation of 
economic trusts, establishment 
of centers focused on educating 
defense employees, funding or 
economic support for training of 
military service members.  
 
 
Key Attribute #2 of NATO as an Organization: Centralization and Independence71 
 Referenced in chapter two is Abbott and Snidal’s argument that IOs possess the functions 
of centralization and independence.72 A strong centralized “apparatus” that takes on greater 
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responsibility independently of member states.73 The characteristics would suggest an 
administrative staff that has demonstrable capacity to act as a third party in disputes between 
MS. Institutionalism suggests this attribute could contribute alternative goals and interests in 
setting objectives for the organization. In the case of a security crisis, NATO staff would then be 
a key arbitrator in policy disputes amongst MS.  
Table 4 
Policy Examples Key Attribute #2 of NATO as an Organization: Centralization and Independence 
Statements Force Posture Economic Factors 
Statements as policy responses 
would see an expanded role of 
the Secretary General of NATO. 
Policy outputs from influential 
members would defer to NATO 
in matters like commentary of 
joint security crises. Meetings, 
summits, or special meetings of 
which NATO acts as a neutral 
third-party arbitrator. Large 
scale changes to a multi-lateral 
organizational structure, such as 




Changes would include NATO 
acting as an independent actor in 
deciding disagreements between 
MS on FP responses: where to 
base troops, lethal aid, and other 
FP related issues. Any force 
posture changes that give 
indication of a NATO 
centralized force structure, 
either by extending the current 
force posture or the creation of 
new units or headquarter 
structures. Military aid, planning 
in defense procurements, or 
other military financing that 
enables a neutral third party 
based on multilateralism to 
impact the capabilities of a MS 
or partner state. 
 
NATO as an organization 
providing influence on areas like 
implementing economic 
sanctions. An increase in 
funding for states experiencing 




Attributes of NATO as a “Community”  
In this section constructivism, and its shared community based on value and norms will 
be applied to the aspect of policy outputs where NATO and its influential MS acted according to 
a role of a community. 
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Key Attribute #1 of NATO as a Community: Shared Identity 
 A shared identity of the community is shaped from common values such as survival, 
common defense, humanitarian concerns, and the liberal democratic order. The attribute will 
suggest parameters for how to look for outputs that are consistent with NATO’s trait of a 
community. The primary motivator for shared identity is to build up the values of the 
community. In responding to security crises, borders are not the focal point, instead it is the 
relationship between the details of the crisis in comparison with the shared values that the 
community identifies with. Bosnia and Kosovo represent a good example of “shared identity” in 
action. The community responded to out of area ethnic conflicts because it was against their 
shared identity based on humanitarian values.  
Table 5 
Policy Examples Key Attribute #1 of NATO as a Community: Shared Identity 
Statements Force Posture Economic Factors 
Announcements as policy 
responses will be examined for 
differences in language. Are 
events against values such as 
territorial integrity, or broader to 
include concerns regarding 
humanitarian issues, the liberal 
democratic order, or shared 
ideals. In the immediate 
aftermath of the crises, did 
world leaders respond to the 
events as matters that “shock” 
the international communities 
shared values: or was the 
response less shocking and more 
of calls to “respect borders”.  
Changes in FP based on the trait 
of shared identities would 
include stronger responses for 
events that went against the 
shared identity of the 
community of MS. Similar 
incidents should prompt similar 
policy outputs: territorial 
incursions should see similar 
responses. If shared identify is 
not had, the attribute would 
suggest weaker policy outputs 
and perhaps a fray in the threat 
perception of the alliance.  
 
Economic indicators would 
mirror those of FP. If shared 
identity of the community is 
challenged, consistent policy 
outputs would result in similar 
crises. The expectation would be 







Key Attribute #2 of NATO as a Community: Shared Norms 
 The norms of constructivism are the means in which the community responds. It is the 
agreed process for constructivism that provides responses, basing its action from established 
principles and mechanisms for dealing with crises.74 An example might be that MS respond to 
security crises through multilateral consensus in the NAC. Compliance with the structural 
process is integral to NATO acting as a community. A multilateral approach to solving problems 
is expected, and if absent is indicative of a weakened alliance.75 However, in constructivism a 
multilateral approach results from the agreed to norms and community identity and not from a 
belief in “rules” based interdependency that promotes compliance through institutionalism.  
Table 6 
Policy Examples Key Attribute #2 of NATO as a Community: Shared Norms 
Statements Force Posture Economic Factors 
Shared norms are the means in 
which announcements are made. 
A community would respond 
through the organization and is 
not consistent with unilateral 
statements. In moments of 
crises, the shared norms would 
indicate a traditional response of 
what was expected of the 
organization. The community if 
unified in action would respond 
with multilateralism. 
 
If consistent with previous 
responses, then norms are being 
held in accordance with the 
perspective. If a change in 
norms of the organization in FP 
occurs, it might be indicative of 
a weakened alliance or another 
perspective at work 
 
If consistent with previous 
responses, then norms are being 
held in accordance with the 
perspective. If a change in 
norms of the organization in 
economic factors occur, it might 
be indicative of a weakened 
alliance or another perspective 
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY OF NATO AND KEY MEMBERS POLICY OUTPUTS AS 
A RESULT OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN GEORGIA IN 2008 
 
The following case study involves policy responses of NATO, and its key member states 
of Germany and the United States, in response to or as a result of Russian actions within the 
generally accepted 76 international boundaries of Georgia in 2008. The study is designed to 
highlight key policy outputs by NATO, Germany, and the US prior to the conflict in 2007, 
leading to the conflict in early 2008, during and immediately following military actions in 
August 2008, and in 2009. The case study framework will first examine the evidence of what 
transpired within the borders of Georgia and follow with evidence of instigating factors 77 of the 
conflict. The case study will then first introduce the policy outputs 78 that resulted from NATO, 
then from the United States, and from Germany. The review of the policy outputs will place the 
outputs into three separate categories: statements, force posture, and/or economic measures. 
Policy outputs provided in the case study are not all inclusive, and instead represent responses 
during the listed time period by each actor that are consistent with the earlier defined parameters 
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of the three characteristics of NATO. 79 A lack of policy output in the form of statements, force 
posture changes, or economic measures will also be cited as evidence.  
Timeline 
Since the end of the Cold War the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the territory 
of Georgia have seen continuous conflict. A brutal civil war in the early 1990s resulted in many 
dead and Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in South Ossetia.80 Following the Rose revolution, the 
government of Georgia continuously tried to end the ongoing disputes by offering concessions 
like autonomy to the region.81 However, both regions had separatist fighters that were backed by 
Russia.82 Russia had for years allowed residents in both regions to obtain Russian citizenship and 
passports.83 As dialogue around Georgia potentially joining NATO grew stronger, the tensions in 
the region also increased. In July 2008, a series of assassinations and military conflicts between 
separatists and Georgian forces took place.84 The same month there was a military exercise in 
Russia at the Georgian border that was very similar to the next month’s conflict.85 During this 
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statement may be provided to explain a stance and press releases confirming the presidential statement will not 
be included in the case study.  





85 (Dr. Ariel Cohen, June 09, 2011, Accessed on 16FEB2019) 
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timeframe, as Georgia sounded warning calls to the international community, Russian air forces 
conducted flights over Georgian territory.86  
On August 7, South Ossetia claimed that Georgian forces launched an artillery attack into 
the region, while Georgia “reported intense bombings of Georgian villages in South Ossetia”.87 
The Russian Security Council met the next day and immediately launched a large-scale attack 
against Georgia. 88 Reports indicated that hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands Russian 
soldiers took part in military actions in both regions.89 The Russian Black Sea fleet provided 
reinforcements to the region on August 10.90 The fighting took place not only in both regions, 
but up to just miles away from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.91 On August 12, a preliminary 
peace plan was brokered.92 However, Russian forces continued to “degrade” Georgia military 
defense structures outside of the regions to create a “buffer zone”.93 On August 25, Russia 
formally recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “independent”. 94 The Russian forces finally 
withdraw to the regions as part of the “follow-on ceasefire agreement” signed on September 8.95
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Prelude to War 
Prior to Russian aggression in 2008, Georgia was important to both Russia and the 
United States. The area had signs of potential warfare between the Georgians and Russians 
existing for decades. 96 In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Georgia was the site of 
civil wars in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which ended with a ceasefire and the 
presence of Russian forces under the pretense of peacekeepers. 97 The land in the disputed areas 
was significantly important to Russia, due in part to its geostrategic importance in the region, 
with military basing advantages for Russia in terms of air and naval forces, and in part to its 
strategic location in blocking potential new oil pipelines through Russia or Turkey. 98 Georgia 
was also significant for its contributions to the War on Terror being conducted by the United 
States. The Americans considered Georgia’s contributions, involving overflight rights and the 
support to the allied effort in terms of personnel. 99  
Geopolitically the events in 2008 were not conducted in a political vacuum. NATO had 
declared an intention for Georgia to eventually become a member prior to the conflict during its 
2008 summit. 100 The United States had lobbied for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) but 
ultimately the member states stopped just shy of the plan while saying the MAP was possible in 
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97 (Markovic, 17 September 2008) section War in South Ossetia 
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and Americans, but a commitment for a process forward was assured.  
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the future. 101 The Kosovo declaration of independence saw renewed Russian fears of 
expansionism in their sphere of influence and simultaneously prompted Russian calls for 
independence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 102 The resulting war in Georgia presented the 
region with a highly consequential new security concern.  
The conflict showcased immediate differences of opinion relating to different viewpoints 
concerning threat perception. The European Union commissioned an “independent” investigation 
of the war. 103 The European Union investigation concluded that while both parties were partly to 
blame, it was Georgia that started the confrontation. 104 The results prompted some NATO MS 
like Germany, to have concerns of who was the instigator of the conflict.105 If the results were 
held to be true, then MS might hold different threat perceptions. If a MS did not believe Russia 
was an instigator, then the threat perception would be less than MS who did. The report focused 
on the specific actions from August 7-8, 2008, however the EU report downplayed such key 
aspects as: the build-up of Russian military forces on the Georgian border prior to the conflict, 
and addressing whether a state has the right to self-defense in the face of an imminent military 
threat. 106 As a result, the investigation was debated and prompted various responses as to whom 
the guilty party was in starting the conflict. 107 Testimony provided in the United States House 
report on the matter found several concerning details: Russian peacekeepers were not in 
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approved locations/positions, recent Russian military exercise scenario had been an accurate 
dress rehearsal to the invasion into Georgia, Russian military had recently violated international 
airspace and brazenly proclaimed it as a “warning”, in 2007, the Russians had conducted aerial 
attacks in Abkhazia, and the Russians had refused multiple calls from a coalition of international 
countries in June 2008, to come to the negotiating table to avoid military confrontation.108  
The Response of NATO  
Statements as Policy Outputs 
 In the year preceding military action in Georgia, Russia and NATO were actively 
engaged in dialogue and exploring partnerships in their main vehicle for talks, the NATO-Russia 
Council. 109 Disagreements concerning the events in Georgia were publicly acknowledged as 
were agreements during regular meetings, joint statements, and press conferences as a result of 
the NATO-Russia Council. 110 In a 2007 press conference, the NATO Secretary General De 
Hoop Scheffer stated after a bilateral meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov about the 
absence of Georgian involvement in NATO: 
It is clear that a decision, if any, on NATO enlargement, or of the phases leading to 
NATO enlargement, be it Membership Action Plan, be it Intensified Dialogue, will be 
taken by the 26 allies... 111 
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NATO enlargement in the time period immediately preceding Russian aggression was not a 
forgone conclusion nor was it out of the realm of possibility. In a speech in 2007 at the Tbilisi 
State University, then NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer notably outlined: 
The door to NATO membership is open today, and it will remain open in the future… 
But let me also stress two other things… And second, that no country which is not a 
member of NATO has a veto or “droit de regard” over NATO enlargement 
decisions… 112 
NATO addressed Georgia at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. NATO officially “welcomed” 
the “aspirations” of Georgia for becoming a member of NATO and provided “support” for the 
next step of applying for a Membership Action Plan, thus denying the Georgians a MAP as a 
result of the Summit. 113 Near the end of the Summit declaration, Items #42 and #43 addressed 
Russian activities in the area. Citing “the persistence of regional conflicts” and “continued 
support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of… Georgia,” the summit 
declaration stops short of condemnation of Russian aggression in the region. 114  
In June 2008, the NATO-Russia Council met at the ministerial level, and did not have a 
press conference; instead, the NRC published a short statement citing areas of cooperation in 
missile defense, the ongoing international War on Terror, and combating drug traffickers. 115 
Notably absent was any mention of Georgia, even after NATO press releases from the Secretary 
General of NATO had condemned Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 116 
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Activities continued as normal between Russia and NATO, with Russia participating in a NATO 
and partner state disaster relief exercise. 117 As a result of Russian aggression in August 2008, the 
NRC did not meet again until December 2009.  
 The North Atlantic Council met at the ministerial level and quickly produced a press 
release detailing the council’s consensus on the matter on 19 August 2008. 118 The following key 
statements from the document detail the organizations approach to the matter.  
The North Atlantic Council met in special Ministerial session on 19 August 2008, 
expressed its grave concern over the situation in Georgia… A peaceful and lasting 
solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of 
Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international 
law and UN Security Council resolutions... We remain concerned by Russia's actions 
during this crisis… Russian military action has been disproportionate and inconsistent 
with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful 
conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and 
the Rome Declaration... 119 
The official statement from NATO as a result of the military actions in Georgia was to “express 
their grave concern over the situation.”120 The statement called for an end to the violence and 
was careful to avoid outright condemnation of either party while citing aid given to Georgia and 
acknowledgment of “disproportionate” responses from Russia. 121 However, diplomacy between 
NATO and Russia was only temporarily halted as a result of the aggression. In December 2008, 
the chairman of the NRC, the Secretary General of NATO, traveled to Russia to meet with the 
Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. The concluding press release of the 
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meeting did mention that the “security situation in Georgia” was discussed but did not list 
condemnation of the events or that any conversations had occurred on the subject.122 
Force Posture of NATO 
 The force posture of NATO remained largely unchanged in response to Russian 
intrusions into Georgia. A NATO Partnership for Peace training exercise, Immediate Response, 
took place in July 2008.123 The exercise was unrelated to the actions between Russia and 
Georgia. The training was focused on security cooperation and building the partnership between 
Georgia and the United States. 124 In 2009, Georgia was host to a very similar NATO training 
exercise, which while provocative in Russia was similar to the previous year’s exercise and did 
not appear to be as a result of the Russian aggression in  2008. 125 Several changes in force 
posture were instead happening at the civilian level within NATO, as several programs intended 
to help the Ministry of Defense of Georgia were introduced in the areas of procurement and 
civilian defense training. 126 The largest change in NATO forces was created on the civilian and 
institutional side instead of the military. The NATO-Georgia Commission created in 2008, was 
introduced at the ministerial level. 127 The official purpose of the NGC was “to serve as a forum 
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for political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia achieve its goal of 
membership in NATO.” 128  
NATO Economic Measures as Policy Outputs 
 In the immediate aftermath of Russian aggression, there were no major exercise 
infrastructure building projects by NATO. Economic aid was provided by many countries, 
including the United States, several EU states, and Japan. While aid from the Americans and 
Japanese was given at the bilateral level, the European states convened a meeting in 2009 at the 
European Union level in Brussels to deliver a multilaterally built economic aid package by the 
European Commission. 129 Other international organizations that gave economic aid included the 
World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD.) 130 Most 
noticeable was the absence of funding for military related purchases. The funding instead 
focused on humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts. 131 
US Policy Output Responses  
 The United States during the 2000s under the presidency of George Bush was the 
strongest advocate for the government of the Republic of Georgia to attain NATO 
membership. 132 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Georgia had been one of the 
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United States staunchest allies in the War on Terror, with thousands of soldiers deployed with 
allied forces. 133 In the immediate reaction to the invasion of the Russians, the United States flew 
2,000 Georgia soldiers on US transport planes from Iraq back to Tblisi, Georgia. 134 The United 
States in the abrupt aftermath was also the largest provider of economic assistance with a pledge 
immediately following the conflict of $1 billion dollars in aid. 135 Some of the various forms of 
economic aid would soon arrive on US military transport vessels, much to the chagrin of the 
Russians. 136 The United States provided these responses unilaterally, in addition to support 
provided by NATO multilaterally.  
US Statements  
 The United States at the time of the Russian invasion of Georgia called for an end to 
violence. Absent an outright condemnation of Russian activities, President Bush’s response was 
the western world’s most critical of Russian activities in the region: 
Georgia is a sovereign state and its territorial integrity must be respected… We call for an 
end to the Russian bombings, and a return by the parties to the status quo of August the 
6th… Russia has invaded a sovereign neighboring state and threatens a democratic 
government elected by its people. Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century. 137  
 
 The US policy remained similar through the transition between President George W. 
Bush to President Barrack Obama, in July 2009 while looking to advance and reset the 
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relationship with Russia, President Obama’s press office also sent a clear message regarding its 
policy in relation to Georgia. 138 
The Obama Administration continues to have serious disagreements with the Russian 
government over Georgia.  We continue to call for Russia to end its occupation of the 
Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in parallel have worked with the 
Russian government to prevent further military escalations in the region… and continue 
to press for the strengthening of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms and a 
return of international observers to the two occupied regions of Georgia. 139 
 
US Force Posture Policy Outputs 
 The United States had training programs in Georgia prior to the Russian aggression, such 
as a “Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)” started in 2002, which was centered on training 
forces for the War on Terror. 140 The immediate aftermath of the Russian aggression brought the 
arrival of US transport equipment for redeployment of personnel from Iraq and the transport of 
humanitarian aid. However, these movements of personnel and equipment were temporary in 
nature and did not include lethal support. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict there was no 
large-scale change to training missions. The US did provide the majority support for a NATO 
training mission named the “Georgian Deployment Program,” which was started in 2009. 141 The 
goal of the program was focused on providing training and certification for Georgian battalions 
deploying to Afghanistan as part of NATO.142 A small naval exercise the following year 
involving one US ship, immediately drew a hostile response from Russia and was indicative of 
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the small change to training exercises in the region. 143 Large training exercises as a result of the 
conflict were not planned, and the exercises that did take place were consistent with a focus on 
the War on Terror. 
US Policy Outputs in Economic Matters 
 The US provided the largest economic response to the Russian aggression, with a total 
pledged package of $1 billion dollars in aid. 144 However, the pledged package was implemented 
over the course of several years, with FY2009 foreign assistance totaling only $312 million 
dollars.145 The aid was provided promptly and included medical supplies and reconstruction 
funds outside of resourcing the supplies transport. 146 Noticeable in the immediate timeframe of 
the conflict was what was not sent: 
- No funding for combat troops; the military only provided transport for the redeployment 
of Georgian troops and for humanitarian supplies 
- No immediate funding or resupplying military forces  
- Military sales of lethal aid were not provided: the focus was instead on “small arms, 
communications, and medical gear147 
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There was an increase in military training expenditures from FY2008 through FY2010. 
Foreign military financing increased from FY 2008-FY2009, but a drop in FY 2010. The largest 
factor appears to be foreign military sales of equipment with an increase to over $7 million 
dollars in FY 2010.  
German Policy Outputs 
Compared to France, the UK, the US, and the EU, Germany showed a delayed response to 
the Russian-Georgian War as indicated in Table 8. The European Council presidency was held 
by France in August 2008, and French President Sarkozy took a leading role at the time of the 
aggression. 148 For Germany, Russia was a large trading power with significant resource ties that 
grew stronger in the following months. 149 A geopolitical decision that antagonized or 
endangered the economic relationship between the two countries would have created a political 
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concern in Germany. 150 The relatively weak responses, have been argued by some to be a form 
of weak appeasement in order not to offend a large trading partner. 151 The German government 
for years had been in discussion in relation to a gas pipeline directly linking with Russia. 152 
Germany’s position was consistent with its position at the NATO Bucharest Summit earlier in 
the same year, when it opposed a MAP for Georgia. 153
Statements as Policy Outputs 
 Chancellor Merkel’s first response to Russian aggression was on 15 August 2008. It was 
most notable for the location from which the response was given, in Moscow at a joint press 
conference with Russian leadership. 
And I said very clearly that of course it is always a great pity when there are victims and 
here unfortunately there are many, many victims, but that even when you take into 
account Russia’s description of the situation, I would still say that Russia’s reaction has 
been disproportionate, and that the presence of military forces in the very heart of 
Georgian territory is wrong. 154  
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The combination of the lateness of the statement by the German Chancellor and the 
location where the statement was made is evidence of the German response to the conflict. 
Furthermore, the role of the military did not seem to be an option from the beginning, with the 
German Foreign Minister in 2008 stating that the focus was on “how we could quickly and 
effectively deliver humanitarian aid.” 155 While a call for an immediate ceasefire was made by 
many German politicians, the sentiments of who was at fault and relief of Georgia not being a 
NATO member were apparent. 156 
The response from the German government in August 2008 was soon followed by the 
next meeting of Angela Merkel in Moscow, in October 2008. According to one press account, 
the meeting was conducted in Moscow to “mend ties.” 157 However, the meeting between the two 
countries also included meetings between major energy companies, signing key trade agreements 
related to energy, and talks over the gas pipeline Nordstream. 158 
German Force Posture Changes 
Germany was not conducting military training exercises in a bilateral fashion with the 
Georgians inside or outside of the country prior to the war. There was no support provided to the 
NATO sponsored exercise in 2008, prior to the start of the conflict. 159No German transporters 
were reported to have been used, nor were they offered for providing assistance in the immediate 
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aftermath of the war. The largest change in force posture policy outputs for the Germans was 
made with civilian forces through its commitment with the European Union. The European 
Union responded with an EU Monitoring Mission in 2008 for which Germany played a role and 
committed funds. 160  
German Economic Measures as Policy Outputs 
In the immediate aftermath of the war in Georgia, German economic responses were 
most notable for the absence of policy outputs. A total of over 33 million euros was allocated for 
humanitarian purposes, paling in comparison to other large donors like the United States or the 
World Bank. 161 The largest evidence of economic measures were the financial agreements made 
between Germany and Russia in October 2008 and the continuation of planning for the 
Nordstream pipeline. 162 Planning and preparations for more economic cooperation rather than 
any sort of sanction, embargo, or economic support delivered to Georgia was the preferred 
option for Germany. 163 
Analysis of Policy Outputs from the Perspective of NATO as an Alliance 
Support to the key attribute of maximizing power capabilities related to NATO as an 
alliance finds inconsistent evidence. Exercises were introduced after the conflict, but statements 
and fact sheets indicate that the exercises were planned prior to the conflict. An increase was 
noted in military related sales and educational training by the Americans. However, the training 
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specifically did not include lethal aid and no combat support was provided. Evidence from 
Germany demonstrate a lack of policy outputs to increase FP. 
In evaluating the through the framework of NATO as an organization there was 
consistent evidence found. The NGC was created and provided strong evidence for deepening an 
existing partnership with a special relationship. German policy responses are consistent with a 
preference for the EU taking a large role. The US increased support for defense reform education 
and provided statements that indicated preference for a multilateral approach to a peaceful 
resolution. Preplanned exercises were continued as planned and performed under the joint 
military command structure of NATO. Together the responses specify support for both 
‘interdependent rules-based cooperation’ and ‘centralization & independence’. 
The framework found the evidence was inconsistent in applying the policy outputs to the 
framework of NATO as a community. Statements issued from NATO were suggestive of 
concern, but not calls for decisive responses. Statements from the influential MS of Germany and 
the United States did not indicate consistency with shared identity. The statements from 
President’s Bush and Obama spoke of ‘invading’ or ‘occupying’ actions from the Russians. The 
statements from Chancellor Merkel labeled the aggression as merely ‘wrong’. Furthermore, the 
evidence points to a differing threat perception. Questions over who started the war, indicated 
that the events were not viewed equally amongst the influential MS.  Key evidence was the gap 
between the policy outputs of the US and other actors. A preference was shown for bilateral 


















CHAPTER 4: A CASE STUDY OF NATO, US, AND GERMAN POLICY OUTPUTS AS 
A RESULT OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE  
 
 The main objective of this case study is to introduce policy outputs as a result of the 
Russian aggression in the Ukraine in 2014. In doing so, the case study will also offer a limited 
historical background that will lead to a better understanding of the policy output evidence 
provided. The key actors in the case study will remain NATO, the United States, and Germany. 
Policy outputs will be measured chronologically by actor in a similar structure of statements, 
force posture policies, and policies related to economics such as sanctions and aid provided.  
An Introduction to Russian Military Action in the Ukraine in 2014 
 The relationship between Ukraine and Russia has been complicated since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. A large section of Ukraine prior to the conflict spoke Russian, and cultural ties 
related to religion and the history within the Soviet Union indicate a strong connection between 
the two states. 164 Security challenges were apparent in the relationship between Ukraine and 
Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1994, Ukraine gave up a nuclear arsenal established 
during Soviet Union times: Ukraine had signed the Budapest Memorandum alongside the UK, 
the US, and Russia, which provided assurances from Russia that the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine would be upheld. 165 The dissolution of the Soviet Union also presented challenges 
relating to military bases. The Ukrainian town of Sevastopol housed a naval harbor and other 
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bases in the region, providing Russia access to the Black Sea. 166 Ukraine in the late 1990s leased 
these bases and harbors to Russia. The lead up to the acts of aggression by Russia, can be partly 
traced back to economics and spheres of influence, with Russia pursuing a new relationship with 
Ukraine in the Eurasian Economic Union, and concurrently trying to end an economic deal 
between Ukraine and the European Union. 167  
 Prior to the conflict, Ukraine also maintained a relationship with NATO. A long-
established Partner for Peace, Ukraine was also a partner that was afforded the special 
relationship of having a dedicated NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). 168 Ukraine during a 
period of increased troubles with Russia in relation to resources, applied for NATO membership 
in January 2008. 169 The decision was ultimately denied in the April 2008 NATO summit, due to 
several countries, such as Germany, not wanting to extend membership. 170 However, 
interdependency ties strengthened between Ukraine and NATO, with the alliance funding an 
annual review process: the Annual National Program. This program provided a plan and support 
for help in achieving defense reform objectives in 2009. Another program aimed to provide 
education for defense professionals was called the Defense Education Enhancement Program 
(DEEP). 171 The relationship with NATO prior to the conflict can then best be described as a 
close partnership, with a special commission, and a relationship that was strengthening with 
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more programs being added and an assurance from the 2008 Summit declaration for eventual 
membership. 172 
 Security relationships between the United States and Ukraine likewise existed prior to the 
conflict. The United States had established a program for military cooperation and bilateral 
training in the State Partnership Program, with California being Ukraine’s “partner” since 
1993. 173 The US had also taken a lead role in training exercises within Ukraine, seeing security 
cooperation in events like Operation Peace Shield which began in the mid-1990s. 174 Ukraine had 
also started shifting its military to a more modern capability favored by NATO and American 
forces. Ukraine was sending soldiers and leaders to American training programs throughout the 
2000s. 175 The relationship had also changed following 2008, with the deployment of Ukrainian 
personnel to Afghanistan in support of the War on Terror. 176 Based on these programs, it is 
apparent that there was an existing security cooperation prior to the start of the conflict.  
 The relationship between Germany and Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union was not 
as strong in military cooperation as were ties with the Americans. However, the Germans did 
take part in NATO exercises in which Ukrainians took part, such as Rapid Trident. The ties were 
closely related to trade and to resources such as energy. Germany had long established bilateral 
ties with a ‘High Level Working Group focused on economic issues’ since 2005. 177 Chancellor 
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Merkel in 2007 had worked to establish a free trade zone with Ukraine: but the Germans did not 
identify any date or further actions/summits/statements that indicated support for eventual EU 
membership. However, perhaps the most importance fact prior to the conflict with Russia, was 
the Nordstream pipeline. Disagreements between Russia and Ukraine over the flow of gas and 
other geopolitical matters, partly led to the decision for the building of the controversial pipeline 
to Germany that bypasses Ukraine altogether. 178 
Key Events 
 The policy outputs will focus on the responses to Russian action in Ukraine 2014. The 
events were undoubtedly a result of a multitude of factors. However, for brevity the background 
will begin with the protests that resulted after then Ukrainian President Yanukovych did not sign 
a key economic agreement with the EU.179 The ‘Euromaidan’ started in November 2013, and 
steadily grew in the face of a violent response from the Ukrainian government.180 In February, 
the events turned deadlier and in the face of an increasing movement and international 
opposition, Yanukovych fled.181 Russia responded to these events by sending military forces into 
Crimea.182 Following the annexation and ‘referendum’, Russia backed separatists started fighting 
in Eastern Ukraine in April.183 International outcry over the Russian aggression grew stronger in 
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the face of Russian denials of support, and the shooting down of a civilian airliner on 17 July.184 
A preliminary peace accord was reached in September, known as the Minsk protocol.185 
However, the fighting persisted in Ukraine while Russia continued to deny the backing of 
separatists in the region.186 A second ceasefire was negotiated and signed on February  11 2015, 
and sporadic fighting has continued.187  
The focus is on the policy outputs of NATO and its key member states of Germany and 
the United States. Therefore, the case study identifies key moments of the conflict in order to 
analyze the policy outputs chronologically. The events will only focus on key dates for the 
evidence that will be presented in this chapter relating to policy outputs from NATO, Germany, 
and the United States.188 
- 22 November 2013, Ukrainian government announces it will not sign AA with EU  
- November 2013, Protestors ‘take to the streets’ over refusal to sign deal with EU  
- 18 February 2014, Protestors clash with government forces  
- 22 February 2014, President Yanukovych dismissed 
- 26 February 2014, NATO Ministers of Defense Meet  
- 2 March 2014, Russia send troops to Crimea 
- 3 March 2014, Russia announces plan to build a bridge between Crimea and Russian 
Taman peninsula  
- 4 March 2014, NAC Meeting on Ukraine  
- 16 March 2014, Referendum vote held in Crimea 
- 10 April 2014, NATO release images of Russians in Eastern Ukraine  
- 26 May 2014, Poroshenko wins election  
- 27 June 2014, EU signs economic agreements with Ukraine 
- 17 July 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 shot down over Eastern Ukraine 
- 4-5 September 2014, The NATO Wales Summit 
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- 5 September 2014, Minsk Protocol signed that indicated ceasefire supervised by the 
OSCE 
- 9 November 2014, Fighting resumes in Eastern Ukraine between separatists and 
Ukrainian government 
- 11 February 2015, Minsk II signed 189 
 
NATO Policy Outputs 
  NATO policy outputs in the form of statements were put out promptly, in some instances 
on the same day of action. When ‘little green men’ appeared in Crimea, the NUC met the same 
day and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said: 
…This morning’s action by an armed group is dangerous and irresponsible.  I urge Russia 
not to take any action that could escalate tension or create misunderstanding… 190 
The Secretary General was also the first to issue a statement following the announcement of the 
actions in Crimea. The statement was strongly worded and was a precursor to meetings that 
would soon take place within the NAC. 
…I have convened the North Atlantic Council today because of Russia’s military action 
in Ukraine. And because of President Putin’s threats against this sovereign nation. What 
Russia is doing now in Ukraine violates the principles of the United Nations Charter. It 
threatens peace and security in Europe. Russia must stop its military activities and its 
threats… 191 
The following statement by the NAC after its joint session set the stakes even higher; 
The North Atlantic Council condemns the Russian Federation’s military escalation in 
Crimea and expresses its grave concern regarding the authorisation by the Russian 
Parliament to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. 
Military action against Ukraine by forces of the Russian Federation is a breach of 
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international law and contravenes the principles of the NATO-Russia Council and the 
Partnership for Peace... 192 
Following the ‘referendum’ in Crimea, 193 The NAC again released a statement; 
We consider the so-called referendum held on 16 March in Ukraine’s Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea to be both illegal and illegitimate…We urge the Russian Federation 
to de-escala te the situation, including by ceasing all military activities against 
Ukraine... 194 
The NATO-Ukraine Commission continued to meet amidst ongoing military actions inside of 
Ukraine. In April, the group met at the foreign minister level. The resulting press statement 
continued NATO’s policy and provided a clue as to the future of policy outputs: 
We do not recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea…We call 
on Russia to de-escalate by reducing its troops in Crimea to pre-crisis levels and 
withdrawing them to their bases; to reduce its military activities along the Ukrainian 
border; to reverse the illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea… We support the 
deployment of an OSCE monitoring mission to Ukraine… NATO and Ukraine will 
intensify cooperation and promote defence reforms through capacity building and 
capability development programmes... We welcome Ukraine’s signature of the political 
chapters of the Association Agreement with the European Union on 21 March...195 
The next meeting of the NUC occurred at the Wales NATO summit in September. Much of the 
rhetoric of the resulting meeting mirrored that of the Wales Summit declaration. The policy 
output of the declaration was upfront and could not be misinterpreted. The ‘aggressive acts’ by 
Russia were called out in the first point of the declaration. 196 The Wales summit was largely 
about Russia and Ukraine, highlighted by the fact that NATO members invited President 
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Poroshenko of Ukraine as a guest to the event and convened a meeting of the NUC. 197 
Noticeably absent, was an invitation to any Russian representatives to the summit.198 However, 
the declaration as a result of the alliance’s work at the summit brought about large policy 
responses introduced for the first time: 199 
- Point 5 introduced the ‘Readiness Action Plan’, a comprehensive package that addressed 
the new security environment 
- Point 8 highlighted changes to the NATO Response Force (NRF,) with the creation of the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) 
- Point 13, highlighted the need for more exercises to combat the hybrid warfare threat  
- Point 15 pledged military expenditures that amounted to 2 percent spending of GDP with 
a plan to spend at least 20 percent on major equipment purchases 
NATO Changes to Force Posture 
 Much of the force posture seen in Eastern Europe today was set in place by the measures 
adopted by the NATO members in the Wales summit. However, the changes were not without 
debate. Poland and the Baltic states pushed for a heavier troop presence and presence of 
American troops for a response to the Russian aggression. 200 The Wales summit did set in place 
powerful changes to the force posture of NATO. The NRF grew in number to 40,000 soldiers, 
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almost three times its previous strength. 201 A multi-national and rotational air-policing mission 
with fighter jets in the Baltics, also deployed to Romania and to Poland. 202 A new 5,000 soldier 
VJTF with ability to deploy within five days was created. 203 Other changes in force posture 
included new Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACs) deployments, naval 
patrols, increased activity in the Black Sea area and counter-mining operations. 204 Also created 
were NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), which are teams of up to 40 personnel designed to 
facilitate logistics across various countries in eastern Europe. 205 Along with the NFIUs, there 
was the formation of new command and control ‘Headquarters’ units in Romania, increasing the 
‘capabilities’ of the Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters in Poland, and the decision to 
create a new headquarters designed for logistics. 206 The result in the immediate aftermath of 
Russian aggression was decisive and provided fast policy outputs in the form of changes in force 
posture at the multilateral level.  
NATO Economic Related Policy Outputs 
 The policy outputs of NATO associated to economic matters, primarily narrated the 
creation and expenses of the new force posture composed as a result of the Wales Summit. 
However, the consensus was clear in Wales by proclaiming in point 19 of the summit declaration 
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that ‘we support sanctions imposed by the European Union, G7, and others.’ 207 In addition to 
supporting sanctions, NATO established several trust funds with different lead states aimed at 
different areas of support to Ukraine. Those funds, which collectively manage over 5 million 
euros, include Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4); Logistics and 
Standardization; Cyber Defense, Military Career Transition, Medical Rehabilitation; and 
Disposal of Radioactive Waste. 208  
 The largest economic response by NATO related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was 
the formal commitment by MS to two percent defense spending as a percentage of GDP and the 
20 percent goal of new equipment purchases. The goals addressed an existing burden-sharing 
gap in the alliance. At the time of implementation only four NATO members were meeting the 
two percent of GDP guideline. 209 The new guidelines did not address all of the burden-sharing 
issues. For instance, Greece was already nearly meeting the goals prior to Wales and Denmark 
was not, but John Deni suggests the Danes were able to deploy forces better to support missions 
instead of concentrating on a regional focus. 210 The MS did signal a renewed look at burden 
sharing amongst NATO allies directly following the events in Ukraine.  
American Policy Outputs 
 The year 2013 was not a year of increasing cooperation for the governments of the 
United States and Ukraine in terms of bilateral agreements. The US had openly lobbied for and 
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was disappointed, along with the European Union, that Ukraine did not agree to the EU 
Association Agreement relating to free trade. 211 The US had reached out in January 2014, with a 
phone call from the US Vice-President Joe Biden to the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 
to speak of creating a peaceful end to the ongoing demonstrations. 212 As the situation evolved, 
the US quickly addressed the matter in a variety of ways to include press statements, speeches, 
and interviews.   
 In late February, US President Barack Obama spoke with German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel about the ongoing events and discuss the way forward for the US, Germany, and the EU 
in helping to solve the ongoing protests, violence, and political challenges in Ukraine. 213 The 
conversation took place prior to the annexation of Crimea. In late February, when the crisis was 
deepening, President Obama expressed that “we are now deeply concerned by reports of military 
movements taken by the Russian Federation inside of Ukraine.” 214 The statement went further, 
Russia has a historic relationship with Ukraine, including cultural and economic ties, and 
a military facility in Crimea, but any violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity would be deeply destabilizing… It would be a clear violation of Russia’s 
commitment to respect the independence and sovereignty and borders of Ukraine, and of 
international laws… And indeed, the United States will stand with the international 
community in affirming that there will be costs for any military intervention in Ukraine… 
We will continue to coordinate closely with our European allies.  We will continue to 
communicate directly with the Russian government. 215 
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In a special briefing with various press outlets from senior level officials in the Obama White 
House in early March, the focus was clearly on a multilateral solution to the conflict and a 
rejection of Russian rationales for the invasion and annexation of Crimea: 
Yesterday, you know he [President Obama] was updated by his national security team 
and spoke separately with President Putin of Russia, Prime Minister Harper of Canada, 
and President Hollande of France. Today, the President has spoken with Chancellor 
Merkel of Germany. He’ll be – he is either speaking now or will be speaking to Prime 
Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom and President Komorowski of Poland. The 
President’s point in all of his calls, frankly, has been to underscore the complete 
illegitimacy of Russia’s intervention in Crimea, in Ukraine, and to underscore the support 
of the United States for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty… 216 
Over the next year, more statements from American leadership pointed to the general 
understanding of the administration’s views on Russian forces in Ukraine: 
We've seen an illegal referendum in Crimea; an illegitimate move by the Russians to 
annex Crimea; and dangerous risks of escalation, including threats to Ukrainian personnel 
in Crimea and threats to southern and eastern Ukraine as well… And because of these 
choices, the United States is today moving, as we said we would, to impose additional 
costs on Russia. 217 
Russia is responsible for the violence in eastern Ukraine… The violence is encouraged 
by Russia. The separatists are trained by Russia. They are armed by Russia. They are 
funded by Russia. Russia has deliberately and repeatedly violated the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine and the new images of Russian forces inside Ukraine 
make that plain for the world to see. 218 
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In 2015, President Obama presented his National Security Strategy and under a subsection of 
strategy entitle ‘values’, immediately discussed Ukraine.219 The document outlined US 
positions as a result of the past years action by Russia in Ukraine: 
We will strengthen U.S. and international capacity to prevent conflict among and within 
states. In the realm of inter-state conflict, Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity...   Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European 
security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be 
taken for granted... We are reassuring our allies by backing our security commitments 
and increasing responsiveness through training and exercises, as well as a dynamic 
presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression… We will 
support partners such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine so they can better work 
alongside the United States and NATO, as well as provide for their own defense. And 
we will continue to impose significant costs on Russia through sanctions and other 
means while countering Moscow’s deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth. 
We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our 
allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary... 220 
American Force Posture Policy Outputs 
 The force posture changes American leadership made in connection with the Russian 
invasion and annexation of Ukraine were large scale policy changes made multilaterally, 
unilaterally, and bilaterally. The largest driving mechanism for all changes related to the US 
participation was the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) introduced by President Obama in 
June 2014, one month prior to the NATO summit. Some unilateral changes, such as 
                                                          




repositioning of military stock, would later appear in NATO literature on the Readiness Action 
Plan. 221  
 American FP policy outputs related to the crisis began in March prior to the ERI 
announcement. President Obama after his March address to the Russian President, warned of 
‘costs to be paid,’ and ordered the US Department of Defense to reinforce an American air 
force mission in Poland and the Baltics. 222 However, the response was not intended to be one 
purely of American force. When asked about a military intervention, the answer Secretary of 
State John Kerry gave indicated immediately that any military response was NATO’s and 
would be made through the North Atlantic Council. 223 Lethal aid to Ukraine was discussed as a 
bilateral option but was ultimately turned down. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel argued that 
the Ukrainian military couldn’t “absorb sophisticated weapons.” 224 
 Ultimately, in June 2014, a $1 billion-dollar package ERI was requested by the Obama 
administration. The money was to come from the Department of Defense Overseas 
Contingency Operations budget and included the following: 225 
- Increased troop presence: to include more air force personnel and equipment, naval 
patrols in the Baltics and the Black Sea, and an Armored Brigade Combat Team 
(ABCT) rotationally deployed 
- Security infrastructure improvements for training areas and air force runways 
                                                          
221 (RAP, February 2016) 
222 (DeYoung, March 12, 2014 ). The movements included almost twenty aircraft. A mixture of AWACs, refueling, 
and fighter jets were deployed. 
223 (Kerry, March 2, 2014).  
224 (Sen, May 10, 2016 ) 
225 (Paul Belkin, July 31, 2014) 
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- Money for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova to increase military capacity  
- Money for NATO and bilateral exercises 
The money was quickly put into action to “reassure” allied MS in the face of a new threat. The 
initial bilateral exercise started in early 2014 and was called Operation Atlantic Resolve, 
including Army, Marine, Air Force, and Naval unit participation throughout various countries 
in East Europe. 226 While the exercises were intended for reassurance, they did not indicate a 
permanent change. The United States was clear in the immediate response to the crisis that the 
force posture changes were to be rotational and not permanently based in East Europe. 227
While funding was increased by the United States, the funds were marked for 
multilateral and bilateral exercises, with the President was clear that other countries needed to 
step up and that the US ‘couldn’t do it alone.’ 228 The result has been that US provided funding 
in response to the Russian annexation and invasion in Ukraine has exceeded 13 NATO 
member’s combined defense budgets. 229 Reports from the 2014 NATO summit included more 
financial ‘support’ from the NATO MS for the bilateral exercises and money put aside for the 
pre-positioning of military stock in Europe. 230  
 
                                                          
226 (Brzezinski, June 3, 2015 ). The exercise included the participation of armored brigade combat teams 
rotationally deployed. (F. Stephen Larrabee S. P., 2017, p. 30) 
227 (Secretary O. o., June 03, 2014) 
228 (Komorowski, June 03, 2014) 
229 (Kochis, May 29, 2018). The majority of the funding has gone to the US army for the purposes of pre-positioning 
equipment and for the increased force posture in Europe.  
230 (Banica, Bucharest Iss. 53, ) 
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American Economic Policy Output Responses 
 Military aid and sales dramatically increased as a result of Russian aggression. There 
was a modest increase in military training funds, but the largest changes in training were 
previously discussed as part of the European Reassurance Initiative. 231 The first year did see a 
vast commitment for economic policy outputs unrelated to external security for Ukraine: $20 
million dollars for rule of law reform; a $1 billion loan guarantee that was contingent on a deal 
with the IMF; and money for ‘anti-corruption, energy security, human rights, and security 
sector reforms’ that for 2014 was over $320 million dollars. 232 
 Additional US policy outputs included sanctions that were levied following the 
annexation. A series of executive orders outlined an ever-expanding list of Russian individuals 
and banks sanctioned unilaterally by the United States. 233 Some of the major sanctions levied 
during the year after the annexation included suspension of all ‘trade and investment’; multiple 
banks and individuals sanctioned March 2014; April through December an export ban to 
Crimea was introduced businesses and more individuals and banks sanctioned; and March 
2015 the sanctions were extended. 234
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German Policy Outputs 
 Germany was in a unique situation at the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine. Germany’s 
role in the upcoming events can perhaps best be described by an article from Carnegie Europe: 
Germany has become a leader in the Ukraine crisis for three reasons. First, German 
power has grown since the country’s reunification in 1990. Germany not only has the 
biggest economy and the largest population in the EU but also lies geographically at the 
center of the union and is deeply embedded in EU structures. Second, the crisis is of vital 
importance for Germany because the entire geopolitical order to the country’s East is at 
stake. Third, there was no one else to take the lead. 235 
While the annexation of Crimea had already been discussed with US President Barack Obama in 
early March 2014, German Chancellor Merkel struck a reserved tone in response to the events, 
as seen in reporting from the BBC in early March 2014: 
“So far she [Chancellor Merkel] has confined her public comments to the less than 
bombastic "What is happening in Crimea worries us", and stressing the importance of 
"preserving the territorial integrity" of Ukraine.” 236 
Merkel’s speech formally addressing the situation occurred on 13 March 2014, over a week past 
many others. In the speech, she spoke of cooperation with Russia in the past and working 
together to solve the current crisis, as well as potential sanctions if cooperation was not achieved.  
Russia’s actions in Ukraine undoubtedly represent a violation of fundamental principles 
of international law. They would not be relativised by other international law violations. 
They remain a violation of international law in the heart of Europe, and it is vital that we 
do not simply return to business as usual, and indeed we have not done so. 237 
 
                                                          
235 (Speck, March 26, 2015).  
236 (Evans, 5 March 2014) 




Along with France, Germany soon found itself trying to mediate the crisis as it unfolded. In June 
2014, the leaders of the two countries met with the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine 238 and 
attempted to begin a conversation about potential paths forward for peace. 239 The German 
government over the year also “gradually increased its criticism of Russia,” particularly after the 
shooting down of MH-17. 240 When the Minsk protocol that was established in September 2014 
was soon ‘violated’ and municipal “elections” were planned for parts of Eastern Ukraine, 
Germany responded back with sharp criticism;  
The German government will not recognise the unlawful vote held in parts of eastern 
Ukraine. EU partners are unanimous on this point... “These so-called ‘elections’ breach 
both the letter and the spirit of the Minsk Protocol and were not held in compliance with 
Ukrainian law or the Ukrainian constitution...” 241 
German Force Posture Policy Outputs 
 Prior to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, Germany had been trimming its military. 
Between 2010 and 2015, the cuts had been almost half of its army and air force personnel, with a 
total force of only just over 100,000 personnel. 242 The size of the military in comparison to 
Russian forces, and a historical disinclination since its reunification to use military force left the 
Germans with not much to offer in terms of military changes to force posture in 2014. 243 
However, the Germans did have much to say in terms of force posture during 2014-2015 for not 
                                                          
238 The first meeting between the two since annexation 
239 (Galbert, October 23, 2015) 
240 (Frymark, 2015-02-18 ) 
241 (Office G. C., 2014) 
242 (Chang, March 19, 2015) 
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just their own military but other militaries responses. At the 2015 Munich Security Conference, 
Senator Bob Corker from the United States asked about the German influence, 
…Sen. Bob Corker… told the German chancellor it was her country’s resistance to 
sending in arms that has so far given the White House pause. President Barack Obama 
has yet to decide on the matter and reportedly shares some of Merkel’s concerns. “I think 
most in the U.S. Congress would like to see all of us participate in defensively arming 
Ukraine....” 244 
The view was not shared amongst all influential policy makers of the time, with then NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander and US Forces Europe Commander Phillip Breedlove saying that 
he was “not precluding” the option. 245 General Breedlove said that the “alliance had to consider 
a permanent deployment,” a view not shared by Merkel who successfully lobbied NATO instead 
for the creation of the VJTF for security and reassurance purposes. 246 Through the time period of 
2014-2015, there were multiple instance where Chancellor Merkel stated that the conflict could 
have no military solution. 247 Likewise, when the Baltics and Poland sought for the United States 
or NATO forces to have a permanent presence in Eastern Europe, the Germans argued against 
such actions eventually leading to an agreement for ‘persistent rotational forces.’ 248 
 While the Germans pursued a multilateral approach largely through economic measures, 
there were small changes regarding their own force posture. The NATO Summit in 2014 saw 
Germany and other NATO members agree to the two percent of GDP spending. The German 
defense budget did increase, albeit only by six percent compared to its previous amount and still 
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well below the percentage of GDP of other NATO members. 249 However, there is a consistent 
ongoing effort that has steadily seen increases in their troop strength since the crisis began. 250 
Outside of increases in their force posture, there were other instances where the Germans added 
capabilities. Germany did agree through NATO to create the VJTF and provided forces for naval 
exercises and air policing in the aftermath of the Ukrainian invasion by Russia. 251Humanitarian 
aid missions were conducted by the German military, with over 100 Ukrainian forces flown back 
for treatment in German military hospitals, according to news reports. 252  
German Economic Related Policy Outputs 
 In the absence of a reassurance for Ukraine in terms of military troops or exercises, the 
Germans responded to events in Ukraine with a different kind of reassurance in terms of 
economic policy outputs. The European Union responded with strong sanctions of key civilians, 
businesses, and politicians: the EU also passed visa bans; the European Investment Bank stopped 
investments in Russia; and embargoes were emplaced on military equipment and other goods. 253 
The German leadership of Merkel was instrumental in crafting the EU response. When some 
members of the EU were reluctant to impose sanctions on the Russians, she was ultimately 
successful in swaying the countries who were at first unwilling to support sanction. 254 The path 
was not the ideal path for Merkel to take against Russia, a country with whom Germany shared 
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deep economic ties and against whom the German public was not anxious to sanction. 255 Various 
members of the German political elite and the public, in large polling percentages, did not at first 
back the sanctions. 256 However, the annexation of Crimea, and then the subsequent shooting 
down of MH-17 were too much for Merkel to ignore. An aid package was quickly crafted for a 
500-million-euro loan from Germany to the Ukraine and close to 30 million euros in 
humanitarian aid. 257 Germany also stopped the sale of a ‘military training facility to Russia.’ 258  
 A close trading partner with Russia, Germany has a large Russia export market and 
reliance on Russian energy. 259 Combined with its reluctance, uneasiness, and lack of capabilities 
in terms of utilizing hard power to solve the conflict, Germany led a different type of multilateral 
approach than the United States in seeking an end to the conflict. Ultimately German and French 
efforts to find a lasting solution with the Minsk agreements in 2014 and 2015 have been a 
failure. 260 
Analysis of Policy Outputs  
This section of the thesis will focus on evaluating the evidence in the case study for 
consistency with the key attributes as previously defined. In comparison with Georgia, the 
Ukrainian case study has had a tremendous amount of policy responses from NATO and its 
influential MS immediately after the conflict. The responses showed consistency with NATO 
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continuing to work as an organization in response to the conflict. Interdependent cooperation was 
evident through utilizing the summit for decision-making and implementation of new structures 
like the NATO trusts. A centralized and independent NATO was evident with the expanding new 
military structures and statements from the SECGEN.  
Evidence indicates consistency with the viewpoint of NATO as a community. Policy 
outputs show consistency of all actors in condemnation of Russian actions. Economic interests, 
while still present were sacrificed in favor of economic sanctions, embargoes, and halting 
construction projects in Russia. Disagreements over responses were discussed in traditional 
NATO norms such as the NAC and the NATO Summit. Strong responses were indicative of a 
preference for unified actions in responses to Russian aggression with the shared identity of the 
group.  
The largest changes related to force posture. The changes did show consistency with 
building power capabilities. These results were not maximized absolutely, but instead showed 
that capabilities were expanded for collective defense of the alliance. No lethal aid was given, 
nor was combat support provided. Evidence that shows strong consistency with maximizing 
power capabilities in this regard were the NATO RAP and US ERI. Both programs provided for 
deepening security structures and providing a refocus to collective defense tasks. Rotational 
forces, the creation of the VJTF & NFIUs, announcement of new bilateral and multilateral 
exercises, and repositioning of military stock all indicate that the crisis provided a more unified 

















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION 
 The culmination of the research analyses from chapter three and four show similarities 
throughout the policy outputs with key attributes associated with the perspective of NATO 
responding as an international organization to events in both Georgia and Ukraine. The findings 
demonstrate a connection between the outputs and both key attributes: interdependent rules-
based cooperation, and centralization and independence. However, the stronger responses in 
Ukraine showed a greater similarity with all three key traits of NATO.  
 
 Results support an argument that the initial policy responses in both incidents indicate 
NATO acted according to changing goals and security environments in East Europe in a role best 
defined as an international institution. The number of interdependent institutions created in both 
Table 11 Combined Policy Outputs 
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cases were clear indicators, triangulated with a preference from NATO, the United States, and 
Germany to respond to out-of-area security incidents with multilateralism. The preference was 
continued through different US administrations of both Presidents Bush and Obama. Compliance 
through multilateralism and rules-based structures were evident throughout policy outputs 
associated with statements. Statements indicate a consensus based multilateral decision in both 
Ukraine and Georgia was expected to come from the NAC. Force posture outputs indicated 
several rules-based structures were developed or reinforced in response to the crises: enhanced 
partnerships like the NGC, new trusts for defense reforms in Ukraine, and new military 
command structures are consistent with a growing centralized role for NATO. All three 
examples of policy outputs yielded evidence that was consistent with both key attributes 
associated with NATO responding as an organization.  
A shared identity and norms as key attributes of NATO acting as that of a community 
were not consistent in both cases. The results are not surprising. In 2008, NATO and its member 
states were faced with different security concerns and state interests. The US was involved in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan. The transatlantic community had arguably the largest split since the 
end of the cold war during this period. The war in Iraq had revealed several disagreements within 
the alliance. The expanding membership into Central and Eastern Europe brought about new 
opinions on threat perceptions. However, the evidence indicates the conflict in Ukraine renewed 
the alliance in terms of shared ideals and community values. Stronger condemnations were seen 
along with a greater force posture change and commitments to increase defense spending. The 
policy outputs did not indicate that the threat perceptions were unified, but a recommitment to 
values and shared identity was exhibited in the results.  
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The key attribute of maximizing power capabilities yielded consistency with policy 
outputs in the Ukrainian case study and no consistency in the Georgian case study. Reviewing 
the evidence from both case studies finds similar conclusions in some respects: no lethal aid was 
given in either case, no combat support was given, and NATO was the preferred option if a need 
for security forces arose. However, the differences in outputs were different in the case study of 
Ukraine. Both RAP and ERI included measures for defense reform and training in Ukraine, 
however the primary focus of exercises was in eastern Europe. The power capabilities were 
maximized in relation to the threat and not indicative of a total power maximization. Instead the 
focus was on territorial defense of the MS. A focus on eastern Europe indicates that the 
characteristic of NATO as an alliance focused on collective defense of its MS is consistent with 
the findings. 
Tying the Results Together 
The study has focused on explaining how the characteristics of NATO helps interpret the 
initial policy outputs of the organization in response to Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008, 
and in Ukraine 2014. NATO has shown a historic capacity to meet new challenges with new 
policy outputs. The ability to adapt is indicative of its key traits: an alliance, an organization, and 
that of a community. However, there are moments when these characteristics carry different 
weight amongst MS. Throughout the review, the relationship of a changing security environment 
based on current and fluid threats and MS interests has been key to helping interpret the policy 
outputs. In a complex environment it is unlikely to identify a sole reason for outputs. However, 
by analyzing the evidence in accordance with the established framework we can find consistency 
in which traits of NATO were at play during the creation of the responses. The evidence has 
confirmed the original working assumption that there was a stronger initial response to Russian 
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aggression in Ukraine compared to Georgia from NATO and its influential MS of Germany and 
the United States.  
Utilizing the framework for understanding the responses, the characteristic of NATO as a 
community was not consistent with the outputs in Georgia and returned in Ukraine. No evidence 
pointed to a change in shared values that help shape the shared identity of the community. 
However, the evidence through the literature has shown that MS possess different threat 
perceptions and interests which can impacts its goals. The results indicate that different 
interpretations can impact the attribute of shared values. The policy outputs are consistent not 
that shared values did not exist in Georgia, but that there was a disagreement over how events 
were perceived to have occurred. Different interpretations of events tied with state interest can 
lead to differing viewpoints of what constitutes a “threat” which leads to different responses. A 
strong bilateral response was seen in Georgia by the United States. A return to multilateral 
NATO responses in Ukraine showed consistency with a reengagement of the community trait of 
NATO in both shared norms in this regard, and a unified perception of events indicative of 
shared values that shapes the shared identity of the community. 
The consistent factor throughout both cases was for multilateral responses and the 
building or deepening of interdependent rules-based cooperation structures, like the NGC in 
Georgia and engagement through the NUC in Ukraine. The first response in both case studies  
indicates a preference for the MS to respond as an organization and strengthen institutional ties 
where possible to encourage compliance with the organization’s rules. The “rules” were under 
crisis in both cases. In Georgia, the “rules” did not prevent the NATO partner state from facing 
Russian aggression. A reset in policies, saw only a small delay in the NRC meetings. In Ukraine, 
a NATO partner with an existing special commission was under attack. The NRC was 
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immediately stopped. NATO, the US, and Germany all called for a multilateral response to end 
the conflict and warned of consequences if compliance was not met. To illustrate this, the 
timeline between a return to a focus of collective defense took several months. Had the threat 
been immediate or a preference existed to respond with maximizing power first, the delay would 
not have been as long. The aggression in Ukraine provided a crisis for the trait of NATO as an 
organization. The interdependent rules-based structure of partnerships and commissions were not 
equal to Article 5 protections. To reassure members a stronger response was needed and was 
soon gradually introduced. 
A stronger response is indicative of the trait of NATO as an alliance with a focus on 
collective defense. There was strong evidence found that supports NATO responded with this 
characteristic in Ukraine. The responses in Ukraine signaled a unified reemergence of the 
alliance focused on reassuring MS on its collective defense capabilities. However, this change 
did not take place immediately. The responses indicate a gradual progression for the push to 
maximize capabilities, from spring to the NATO summit in summer. The gradual progression is 
consistent with showing that the first response was to respond as an organization. When the 
failure of the preferred option did not result in a change of Russian actions or policies, the shared 
values at stake grew clearer to all MS. The crisis then impacted all the key characteristics of 
NATO. While the preference for the first response was that of an organization, the policy outputs 
show that when the crisis impacted all three characteristics of NATO, the organization responded 
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